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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW-LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE IMPOSED ON RECIDIVIST GUILTY OF SEVEN
NON-VIOLENT CRIMES CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
PROPORTIONALITY TEST- Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983).
A criminal defendant was convicted of uttering a bad check.'
Prior to this charge the defendant had been convicted of six separate
non-violent felonies. 2 The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under the state recidivist statute. 3 The Supreme
Court of South Dakota affirmed the trial court.4 After two years of
imprisonment the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
district court where it was denied. 5 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the sentence grossly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed in a close decision, holding that the sentence was significantly
disproportionate to the offense committed and therefore violated the
eighth amendment. 7
The eighth amendment concept of proportionality is an established principle that originates from the rights and privileges accorded
English citizens at common law. 8 Fines were proJ'ortioned to the offense as early as the writing of the Magna Carta. Later, the concept
was expanded to include bails and punishments in the English Bill of
Rights. 10 The language in the eighth amendment mirrors that found in
the English Bill of Rights, evidencing the framers' intent that the same
rights enjoyed by English citizens be granted to United States
l. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983). S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-41-1.2

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

(1979). Under normal circumstances the statute authorizes five years imprisonment and up to a $5,000 fine. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-1(7) (Supp.
1983).
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3004. He had been convicted three times for third degree
burglary, once for obtaining money by false pretenses, once for grand larceny,
and once for third offense driving while intoxicated.
ld at 3005-06. "When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior
convictions in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." /d (citing S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981) codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-7-8 (1983)). The sentence for a class one felony is life ~prisonment.
S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 22-6-1 (1979 and Supp. 1980). Additionally, "a person
sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole . . . ." S.D. CoDIFIED
LAWS ANN.§ 24-15-4 (1983).
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 499 (S.D. 1980).
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3006.
Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982), affd, Solem v. Hei.m, 103 S. Ct.
3001 (1983).
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3016 (five to four decision).
ld at 3007 (citing 1 American Archives 700 (4th Series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774)).
/d at 3006; Magna Carta, 1215 regnal year, ch. 20-22.
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3007 (citing I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689)).
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citizens. 11
Despite its longstanding tradition, the constitutional requirement
of proportionality has never been clearly defined by the courts. The
underlying premise of the concept of proportionality is that crimes and
their corresponding punishments are directly related to the changing
standards of society. 12 Trial courts are generally accorded a presumption of correctness in sentencing procedures. Thus, appellate review
has been limited to determining whether a clear abuse of discretion
occurred using a subjective "shock the conscience" analysis. 13 If a sentence is found to "shock the conscience," courts generallyl 4 proceed to
an analysis of the sentence under the more objective proportionality
standard. 15
The proportionality issue was raised in O,Netl v. Vermont, 16 an
1892 Supreme Court case involving the length of sentences. Although
the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 17 the dissent considered
whether the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth amendment. 18 The dissent concluded that sentences that are
excessively long or severe in comparison to the offense charged are unconstitutionally disproportionate and therefore prohibited by the
eighth amendment. 19
The Supreme Court later followed the reasoning of the O,Ne1l dissent by acknowledging the concept of proportionality. 20 In addition,
the Court developed factors to measure sentences so as to prevent the
imposition of a constitutionally disproportionate sentence. 21 The
II. Id Compare U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII with English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M.,
sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689).
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (the concept is one that must "draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a mature society."); see Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see generally Wheeler,
Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1965) (general prison regulatons on mail considered reasonable in a "shock the conscience" test); Workman
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968) (laying out an analysis of
sentences, beginning with the subjective "shock the conscience" test, then proceeding to an objective proportionality test); State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851, 857
(W.Va. 1983) (criminal conviction reversed solely on "shock the conscience" test
without the court finding it necessary to consider a more objective test).
14. See State v. Cooper, 304 S.E.2d 851 (W.Va. 1983).
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16. 144 u.s. 323 (1892).
17. Id at 334-35.
18. Id at 339 (Field, J., dissenting).
19. Id
20. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
21. Id (considering punishment for same or similar crimes in other parts of United
States); see also Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (considering gravity of
offense and harshness of penalty, punishment in other jurisdictions and in the
same jurisdiction); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (considered punishment in other jurisdictions for same or similar crimes, the gravity of the offense
and the harshness of the penalty). The Court, in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
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Supreme Court first applied a proportionality test to determine the constitutionality of a sentence in 1910. 22 In Weems v. United States/ 3 a
government official was convicted of falsifying a public document. He
was sentenced to cadena temporal, a penalty that carried a minimum
twelve year imprisonment and also mandated, inter alia, that the defendant, upon release, would remain under the court's supervision for
the rest of his life. 24 The Weems Court concluded that lifetime supervision was an attendant penalty which deprived the official of essential
liberties. 25 Although Weems did not expressly set forth criteria against
which to measure a sentence, the Court's analysis considered three major areas in invalidating the statute. Implicit in its decision is the consideration of the sentence through a "shock the conscience"
perspective. 26 Specifically, the Court objectively compared the sentence both against those penalties imposed for the same or more severe
offenses in other jurisdictions27 and against similar penalties in the
same jurisdiction. 28 In evaluating both of these factors, the Court
found that cadena temporal constituted cruel and unusual punishment
under the eighth amendment29 because it was disproportionate to the
offense charged. 30
Between 1910 and 1958 the Supreme Court did not rule on the
issue of proportionality. 31 In 1958, the Supreme Court considered a

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

(1892), focused primarily on the severity of the punishment in its dissent. Perhaps
in recognition of the potentially subjective nature of the abstract concept of severity, both state and federal courts have expanded the concept and based their proportionality analysis on a comparison between the specific crime and sentence at
issue and other similar crimes and sentences. See, e.g., MD. CoDE ANN. art. 27,
§ 414(e)(4) (1978); Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1983).
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Wheeler, supra note 12, at 85758.
217 u.s. 349 (1910).
Id at 366.
Its minimum degree is confinement in a penal institution for twelve
years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard
and painful labor, no assistance from friend or relative, no marital authority or parental rights or rights of property, no participation even in
the family council . . . forever kept within voice and view of the criminal magistrate, not being able to change his domicile without giving notice to [authority] and without permission in writing.
Id
/d at 366-67.
ld at 380-82. Weems is factually unique. The Court was considering a sentence
which comported with traditional Philipino laws. The United States, however,
was at the time in control of the nation and so applied United States constitutional
law. The dissimilarities in the social values of each nation were obviously in
conflict.
Id at 380.
Id at 380-81.
Id at 381.
Id at 382.
Although mentioned briefly in dictum in District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617, 627 (1936), the proportionality issue lay dormant, perhaps because the
Supreme Court believed that Weems should be limited to its facts. Packer, Making
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case involving an army deserter who was denied a passport on the
ground that his citizenship was revoked when he was court-martialed. 32
The Court stated that in the abstract, as the death penalty was available
for desertion, a sentence imposing expatriation could not be considered
excessive. 33 The plurality opinion nonetheless adopted the Weems
analysis and found the sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate to
the offense charged. 34 In analyzing the sentence, the Court found that
eighty-two of eighty-four countries in the world did not punish a crime
by denationalization. 35 In addition, expatriation is more destructive of
the individual's psyche than torture or physical harm. 36 Thus, although the Weems proportionality test was not explicitly cited, the
Court sanctioned the use of the objective two-prong analysis in reversing the defendant's sentence. 37
Although prior to 1980 the Weems proportionality analysis was
not used to evaluate the constitutionality of the length of a sentence,
the analysis was refined and repeatedly applied in capital punishment
cases. 38 The application of proportionality analysis to capital punishment cases has been justified on the ground that the death penalty is
irrevocable, whereas a penalty of imprisonment can be reversed. 39 In
1982 the Supreme Court further clarified the proportionality analysis in
Enmund v. Florida 40 by setting forth a s£ectrum of objective areas to
consider in reviewing the death penalty. 1 In Enmund, the defendant
was an accessory to an armed robbery which resulted in the victim's
death. 42 The Court compared the penalties imposed for armed robbery
in other jurisdictions and found that the death penalty was authorized
for felony murder in only nine of the thirty-six states that authorized
the use of the death penalty. 43 In addition, the Court considered the
nature and gravity of the offense, finding that the majority of juries,

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.

the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1076 (1964). Additionally,
proportionality was considered rarely applicable to penalties other than capital
punishment. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1958).
Id at 99.
ld at 101.
Id at 103.
Id at 102-03.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,327 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring). ConIra Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172 (1975).
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 187 (1976).
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
458 u.s. 782 (1982).
Id at 788 ("historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made . . . ";
paraphrasing the earlier plurality opinion of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)).
Id at 784.
Id at 791-92.
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when faced with circumstances similar to those in Enmund, rejected the
death penalty. 44 The Enmund Court next considered other sentences
that had been imposed for felony murder within the same jurisdiction
and found it significant that all felony murder convicts on death row in
Florida, except the defendant, had actually committed the murder. 45
The Court emphasized that no valid state interest, such as deterrence of
killing, was furthered by the imposition of capital punishment, because
the killing was unintentional. 46 In sum, the Court held that the application of the death penalty to the defendant constituted an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence because the defendant lacked the
requisite intent to kill and had not actually committed the murde ·. 47
Although lower courts have sanctioned the use of a proportion.tlity
analysis to non-capital sentences,48 the Supreme Court severely restricted this approach in 1980.49 In Rummel v. Estel/e, 50 the defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment under a recidivist statute after incurring three felony convictions - once for fraudulently using a credit
card, once for passing a forged check, and once for false pretenses. 51
The Rummel Court accorded great deference to the state's legislative
authority to enact mandatory sentences. 52 The Court found that the
state's liberal parole policy was an important variable to consider when
evaluating the defendant's sentence. 5 In addition, the Court held that
the state had a valid interest in increasing sentences of those who are
demonstrably "incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminallaw." 54 Moreover, the Court emphasized that
only rarely would sentences be invalidated solely because of their
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id at 794.
ld at 795.
/d at 797-99.
Id at 801.
See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 415 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that imposition
of maximum sentence for narcotics violations is not unconstitutionally disproportionate); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that sentence
imposed on an habitual offender was unconstitutionally disproportionate under
a four-prong test very similar to that later used in Enmund); Wanstreet v.
Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 214 (W.Va. 1981) (enhanced penalty authorized
under the state recidivist statute held disproportionate to the connected offenses).
Apparently state courts have traditionally accorded their citizens broader protections than those extended under the eighth amendment. ld
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Indicative of the lack of unanimity regarding the appropriate use of the proportionality analysis is the fact that the
Rummel majority becomes the Solem dissent. The Rummel majority suggests that
instances might arise where the test would apply, id at 274 n.ll, but only Justice
Blackmun is convinced to join the dissenters in Rummel and find that the time is
at hand, in Solem, to apply the test.
ld
Id at 265-66.
ld at 274-75, 284.
ld at 280-81.
ld at 276, 280-81.
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length. 55 The Rummel decision implied that the eighth amendment did
not authorize courts to review sentences of imprisonment and that the
determination of sentence lengths was entirely within the perogative of
the legislature. 56
Three years later the Supreme Court departed from its position
that proportionality review was unavailable for sentence terms. In Solem v. Helm, 5 1 the Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, imposed on an habitual offender who was guilty of seven
non-violent crimes, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth amendment. 58 In applying a proportionality analysis, the
Solem Court adopted the criteria set forth in Enmund 59 The Court
initially evaluated the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty. It then compared the life sentence with sentences imposed for
other crimes within the same jurisdiction and finally contrasted the sentence in Solem with sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.60
In reviewing the gravity of the offense, the Court found that the
most recent crime committed by the defendant was passive and did not
involve violence. 61 Although it acknowledged the legitimacy of a state
interest in imposing harsher sentences on habitual offenders, the Court
emphasized the non-violent nature of each of the defendant's convictions.62 In reviewing the severity of the penalty, the Court determined
that the death penalty was not statutorily authorized at the time of the
defendant's conviction; hence, life without parole was the most severe
penalty that the state could impose. 63
The Solem Court then reviewed the statutorily authorized
sentences for felonies committed within the same state. Only a conviction for murder, repeated treason, second-degree manslaughter, firstdegree arson or kidnapping warranted mandatory life sentences. 64 In
addition, a life sentence could be imposed under the recidivist statute
and for second or third convictions of attempted murder, placement of
explosives on an airplane, or first-degree rape. The Court noted that
the statutory penalty for several violent and serious crimes, such as aggravated assault, was a term of years with parole. 65 Thus, the Court
concluded that the defendant's sentence was equal to or greater than
the sentences imposed for more heinous crimes and therefore dispro55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ld at 272.
/d at 274.
103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
ld at 3016.
ld at 3011.
ld
Id at 3012-13.
ld
ld at 3013.
ld
Id at 3014.
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portionate to his offense. 66
In applying the third criterion, the Solem Court found that the
sentence was disproportionate to those sentences imposed on recidivists
in other jurisdictions because only one other state permitted the imposition of life without parole for habitual offenders. 67 Based on its finding that the sentence failed to satisfy each prong of the trifurcated test,
the Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision and granted the defendant habeas corpus relief, provided the state did not resentence
him. 68
In a departure from the traditional view that courts should defer to
legislative determinations of sentence lengths, 69 Solem indicates that
the Supreme Court will subject egregious sentences to proportionality
review. The dissent criticized the majority for departing from precedent, citing Rummel for the proposition that prescribing sentences is
within the prerogative of the legislature and therefore unreviewable in
most instances. 70 The majority, however, did not attempt to limit the
legislature's control over the regulation of sentences and penalties. Instead, the majority expanded the Rummel proposition by ruling that
legislative control does not preclude constitutional review. 71 As indicated by Rummel and Solem, all sentences are potentially reviewable
under a "shock the conscience" test. 72 Solem, however, suggests that
only certain sentences will be reviewed under the proportionality analysis. Whereas the Rummel sentence was reviewed but held to be out of
the Court's purview, the exclusion of parole in Solem crossed the
threshold "shock the conscience" test, thus rendering the sentence subject to Supreme Court proportionality review. 73
The Solem decision highlights the absence of a clear approach in
applying proportionality to the review of sentence lengths. The dissent
validly objected to the majority's failure to establish guidelines for sentence review. 74 Indeed, although the decision ends speculation in the
scenario presented in Solem, there are many questions left open for
further contemplation by the Court. 75 Yet the decision will not result
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

Id
Id
Id at 3006.
See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 40610 (2d Cir. 1978).
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3018 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
Id at 3009-10.
See supra note 13.
Compare Rummel, 445 U.S. at 263 (Court considered the constitutional challenge
to the recidivist statute but affirmed the state verdict) with Solem, 103 S. Ct. at
3001 (Court considered the constitutional challenge to the applied sentence and
reversed it as going beyond appropriate constitutional boundaries).
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3002 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
For example, the Court does not address the issue of sentences for a set term of
years which appear unconscionably long when compared with the severity of the
crime. In addition, it is conceivable that any sentence that is mechanically im-
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in a substantial increase of litigation as the dissenters predicted. 76 It is
clear that after Solem the sentence must still "shock the conscience" to
reach the Supreme Court. In addition, the recent decision of Pulley v.
Harris71 indicates that a sentence will be reviewed for proportionality
only when its imposition is deemed arbitrary and capricious. 78 Thus,
although sentences such as the death penalty and life without parole in
extreme circumstances will be reviewed, Rummel and Pulley emphasize
that the Court will be disinclined to overturn statutorily authorized
sentences.
Contrary to the dissent's claim that the Solem decision violates
principles of federalism by permitting indirect federal intervention in
state sentencing procedures, 79 the majority decision furthers the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to protect individual rights. The decision accomplishes this by expanding the scope of judicial review of
sentencing, while preserving the state's authority to regulate sentencing
as long as legislative safeguards exist. One important factor in determining whether the Court will intervene and conduct a proportionality
review is the degree to which an extreme sentence is mechanically imposed without any consideration of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The statutory provision involved in Solem contained no
legislative safeguards and consequently the decision was subject to judicial review. 80 South Dakota's sentencing scheme mandated an automatic life sentence without parole for all habitual offenders. Unlike
Solem, the California capital sentencing provisions upheld in Pulley 81
require the existence of special aggravating circumstances before the
penalty may be imposed. 82 The Maryland repeat offender statute 83
does not violate the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment under the Solem proportionality analysis. Similar

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

posed for a term of years, regardless of any extraneous circumstances, might also
fall within the analysis framed by Solem.
Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3022 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
/d. at 879-81. One factor that appeared to influence the Court's decision in Solem
that the statutorily authorized sentence exceeded constitutional limits was that penal objectives of rehabilitation, attained by means of a parole system, would be
disserved. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3015; see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
248 (1949) (stating that one of the primary goals of the criminal justice system is
rehabilitation). The Court found untenable the suggestion that even though rehabilitated, the only remedy open to the defendant in Solem was commutation of the
sentence by the governor. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3015-16. South Dakota's commutation policy is very stringent. Where granted, it only allows a prisoner to be
eligible for parole. Moreover, the governor enjoys unfettered discretion over the
decision; there can be no definite expectation of commutation. Indeed, "the best
indication [the Court had] for Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that his
request already [had] been denied." /d. at 3016 n.29.
Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3019 (1983) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
See supra note 3.
Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984).
/d. at 881.
Mo. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B (1982 & Supp. 1983).
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to the South Dakota provision involved in Solem, the Maryland statute
provides that any habitual offender who has been convicted of three
separate crimes, and has served time for each, will automatically be
sentenced to life without parole on the conviction of a fourth violent
crime. 84 Unlike the South Dakota statute, however, the Maryland statute requires the additional consideration of the aggravating factor of
violence. 85
The Court, in Solem, broadened the applicability of the threeprong proportionality test used for review of death penalties by extending it to a sentence of life without parole. The second and third
prongs of this test, which compare the sentence against penalties imposed in the same and other jurisdictions, provide an objective evaluation of the constitutionality of a sentence. The dissent criticized the
subjectivity of the proportionality analysis, 86 perhaps because the first
criterion, evaluation of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty, is not specifically delineated. The clear standard provided
in the second and third criteria, however, provides a balance to the
overall test.
As a result of Solem, state legislatures and courts will be well-advised to consider the proportionality of the sentence imposed to the
offense charged, not only when imposing the death penalty, but also
when imposing a sentence for an extreme term of years, such as life
without parole. The Supreme Court will continue to apply the proportionality test in cases that "shock the conscience." Although legislative
sentencing enactments will remain presumptively valid, the Solem decision has eroded the almost unfettered deference these laws previously
have been accorded.
Elizabeth Gilbert Osterman

84. ld § 643B(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983).
85. ld Compare MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 643B(b) (1982 & Supp. 1983), with statutes cited supra note 3.
86. Solem, 103 S. Ct. at 3017, 3023-24 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).

